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EXPERIENCE AND INQUIRY IN JOHN DEWEY’S CONTEXTUALISM 
 
Christopher C. Kirby 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper will focus on two elements, viz. experience and inquiry, which are 
central to John Dewey’s philosophy and their relation to the movement known as 
“pragmatism.” Although each of these concepts has received extensive treatment by 
other schools of thought, the pragmatists, and particularly Dewey, did much to 
redefine each in hopes of alleviating the tension between conflicting philosophical 
viewpoints. An explication of Dewey’s view on experience is the first step in 
understanding his application of the pragmatic method towards reconstructing 
philosophical thinking. Therefore, this paper will explore the meaning that Dewey 
gave to each and how that meaning is helpful to the overall pragmatist project of 
reuniting philosophical speculation with practical consequences.
  
 
PREFACE – THE METHOD OF PRAGMATISM 
Philosophy recovers itself when it ceases to be a device for dealing with the problems of 
philosophers and becomes a method, cultivated by philosophers, for dealing with the 
problems of men. [MW 10:46] 
A Method, Not a Theory 
 
Today’s world is one of great uncertainty. We are faced with problems both old 
and new, and on a larger scale than our species has ever before witnessed. It could be 
said that the tools of philosophy, i.e. its theories and abstractions, were first forged by 
humanity’s quest for safety against the uncertainty of life. But, if philosophy hopes to 
successfully address the problems facing it now, it may be forced to return from its 
theoretical abstractions to concrete life.  
The American philosophical movement that thrived between the Civil War and 
World War II, commonly known as “pragmatism,” was founded on this notion. 
Unfortunately, pragmatism has been mischaracterized by much of the philosophic 
community. And, although it is fairly well recognized that one of the main precepts 
of pragmatism is the call for philosophic endeavors to concern themselves with 
concrete problems rather than abstract speculations, there is nevertheless a public 
misunderstanding over the meaning of pragmatism.  
While past philosophers have made similar claims about practicality, 
pragmatism is set apart by the gravity it placed on the notion. This has led to an 
unfortunate caricature of pragmatism as the philosophical endorsement of 
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opportunism, found in the worst parts of American industry and commerce. Yet, this 
is a point that nearly every thinker in the pragmatic tradition has explicitly denied.1  
Even those who have some familiarity with pragmatism have tended to 
misjudge its most central tenets.2 One of the most notable misunderstandings is 
perhaps the equation of pragmatism with what has been called the “pragmatic theory 
of truth.” The upshot of this confusion is the identification of the platitude “Truth is 
what works” as pragmatism’s major (and perhaps only) contribution to philosophy. 
However, such a depiction captures what many pragmatists would claim is perhaps 
only a consequence of pragmatism and not one of its central tenets. For instance, 
Charles Sanders Peirce, who coined the movement’s name, saw pragmatism as 
primarily a criterion for determining the meaning of words. Only through the work of 
his friend and colleague, William James, was a more general conception of 
pragmatism as a theory about truth offered. Yet, even James – as the subtitle of his 
1907 work Pragmatism reveals – preferred to see pragmatism as “A New Name for 
Some Old Ways of Thinking.” As he put it elsewhere, 
Philosophies, whether expressed in sonnets or systems, all must 
wear this form. The thinker starts from some experience of the 
practical world, and asks its meaning. He launches himself upon the 
speculative sea, and makes a voyage long or short. He ascends into 
the empyrean, and communes with the eternal essences. But 
whatever his achievements and discoveries be while gone, the 
utmost result they can issue in is some new practical maxim or 
                                                 
1 For example, consider James’ remark to H.G. Wells, “…the moral flabbiness born of the exclusive 
worship of the bitch-goddess SUCCESS. That—with the squalid cash interpretation put on the word 
success—is our national disease.” The Letters of William James, vol. 2 (1920). And, John Dewey’s 
assertion “Pragmatism is… far from being that glorification of action for its own sake which is 
regarded as the peculiar characteristic of American life.” (LW 2:5)  
2 Bertrand Russell’s indictment of Dewey’s notion of inquiry is arguably one instance of this. (cf. 
“Dewey’s New Logic,” In The Library of Living Philosophers, vol. 1. ed. By Paul Schilpp and Lewis 
Hahn. Lasalle, IL: Open Court, (3rd edition) 1989.  
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resolve, or the denial of some old one, with which inevitably he is 
sooner or later washed ashore on the terra firma of concrete life 
again.3
 
As James so poetically expresses in this passage, the main principle of pragmatism – 
finding the difference an idea makes to the real world – underlies all philosophical 
inquiry.   
With this in mind, pragmatism ought to be seen not as North America’s 
attempt to replace old theories with new ones, but rather as an overhauling of the 
method of philosophical thinking through a coalescing of abstract reason with 
practical consequence. In this spirit, James, citing the Italian novelist Giovanni 
Papini, claimed that pragmatism “lies in the midst of [all] our theories, like a 
corridor in a hotel. Innumerable chambers open out of it.”4  
The Development of Pragmatic Method in John Dewey’s Work 
 
To attempt to address the above-mentioned mischaracterization as it applies to 
the entire tradition of pragmatism would present too large of a task to accomplish in 
this investigation. Therefore, this paper will focus mainly only on the philosophy of 
one of the “pragmatic” thinkers. And, although Peirce and James are pivotal figures 
in the development of pragmatism, their views differed to such an extent that to focus 
on either, in my opinion, would present only one pole of pragmatic thought. 
Fortunately, there was a figure that coalesced the differences of Peirce and James 
while staying true to their shared desire to give a method for dealing with the potency 
                                                 
3 James, William. “Reflex Action and Theism,” from The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular 
Philosophy. (Dover: 1956) pgs. 142-143 
4 James, William. “What Pragmatism Means.” from Pragmatism and Other Writings. (New York: 
Penguin Classics) 2000. pg. 26 [my brackets] 
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of ideas. This figure was John Dewey, Peirce’s one-time student at Johns Hopkins 
and an admirer and avid reader of James’ work. 
Born in 1859 to a Burlington grocer, Dewey has been considered by many to 
be the most prolific philosopher the United States has ever produced, though he may 
have rejected that title in favor of being remembered as an “intellectual at large.” For, 
on his view, it was the responsibility of the philosopher to be just as concerned with 
public issues as with esoteric ones. His work – which included an array of 
publications related to politics, pedagogy, logic, and even art – could be seen as the 
embodiment of this view. And, although Dewey preferred to call his philosophy 
“instrumentalism,” because of its emphasis on the utility of ideas in explicating how 
human beings relate to their surroundings, he arguably did more to promote and 
sustain the ideas of pragmatism than any other thinker of his time.5  
However, Dewey did not begin his career as a pragmatist. His mature position 
developed slowly over the course of his very lengthy career, which lasted for more 
than seventy years. His body of work is so prodigious that it has been divided into 
three periods – early, middle and late – roughly corresponding with what many 
consider the three major stages of his career – the idealistic, experimental and 
naturalistic.6 It was in the second stage of his career that Dewey began to assert, like 
                                                 
5 Although James is considered by many to be the foremost pragmatist, because he died at the 
relatively early age of 62, as compared to Dewey’s 93 years, and because Dewey traveled extensively, 
it could be said that Dewey’s influence reached a broader audience and for a longer period of time. 
There are many excellent biographical works on Dewey that illustrate the range of his influence. A 
good introduction for those unfamiliar with Dewey’s work would be Paul Strathern’s Dewey in 90 
Minutes. (Ivan R. Dee Press: Chicago, 2002.)  
6 In his introduction to Dewey’s On Experience, Nature, and Freedom, Richard Bernstein identifies 
three distinct periods in Dewey’s thought, each lasting approximately twenty years. In Dewey’s 
Metaphysics. (New York: Fordham University Press, 1988) Raymond Boisvert labels the first of these 
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Peirce before him, that the method employed by the natural sciences (one that placed 
theories on “probation” until some practical data could affirm or refute them) was the 
method that needed to be applied in philosophy.7 In subsequent years, once Dewey 
had been exposed to James’ “radical empiricism,” i.e. the belief that experience as a 
whole is more than the sum of its parts, he would revise that assertion to include all 
experience, not merely the reflective experience of philosophical inquiry.  
The point of departure for this analysis will be the years just before Dewey 
penned Experience and Nature and thus completed his transition toward naturalism. 
It could be argued that his brand of naturalism consists in two basic criteria: that 
psychological states are reducible to terms about organisms interacting with their 
environment, and, that a form of inquiry patterned after science is the only way to 
utilize experience in dealing with the world. Taken together, these suggest that nature 
is a sort of context in which humankind finds itself embedded. It is my contention 
that the overarching theme of Dewey’s philosophy is, “that the most pervasive 
fallacy of philosophic thinking goes back to neglect of context.”8 Although I believe 
that all of Dewey’s major works after his 1910 offering, How We Think (confer with 
the “Abbreviations” section above), address this theme to some extent or another, 
four titles in particular – Human Nature and Conduct (1922), Experience and Nature 
(1925), Art as Experience (1934), and Logic: The Theory of Inquiry (1938) – will 
                                                                                                                                          
periods “Dewey’s Idealistic Years”, which refers to the pivotal role of Kantian and Hegelian 
philosophy in this stage of Dewey’s development.  
7 Cf. “The Rules of Philosophy,” from Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce. ed. by Charles 
Hartshorne and Paul Weiss. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press) 1934. pgs  156-158, in which 
Peirce wrote “In sciences in which men come to agreement, when a theory has been broached it is 
considered to be on probation until this agreement is reached.” 
8 LW 6:5 
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serve as my main focus. For it was in those four volumes that Dewey worked out the 
conceptual roots of his mature thought – referred to as contextualism. 
While the notion of context was of the utmost importance to Dewey’s thought, 
oddly enough, he rarely wrote on the topic explicitly. This has lent some vagueness 
to this aspect of his thought and is typically treated by Dewey scholars with 
obscurity, if treated at all. That is a tendency I wish to avoid in this analysis, but 
since I will treat Dewey’s notion of context in extensa in the following chapters it 
will suffice in this preface to define contextualism as a philosophical emphasis on the 
environmental, historical and cultural frameworks of ideas. As I will contend, 
Dewey’s expression of the pragmatic method, in which he employed both Peircean 
and Jamesean elements, can be properly understood only when its backward-looking, 
contextual and forward-looking, instrumental components are understood. In this 
analysis, I will recount the core concepts that constitute Dewey’s version of the 
pragmatic method, viz. experience and inquiry, and analyze how they exemplify the 
union of his contextualism and instrumentalism. To sum up my goal in one sentence, 
I believe that Dewey’s work demonstrates that pragmatic method is the recognition 
of context.   
 In chapter one, “Experience: The Formation of Context” I will explore the 
features of Dewey’s conception of experience that set it apart from other accounts as 
well as discuss the implications this account has for Dewey’s conception of 
“context.” My second chapter, “Inquiry: The Enrichment of Context,” will focus on 
Dewey’s view of inquiry, which could be called the central mechanism of his entire 
corpus (with his 1938 publication Logic: The Theory of Inquiry being the most 
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complete articulation of the concept.) I will examine the role inquiry plays, according 
to Dewey, in the formation of contexts. “Growth: The Outcome of Context and the 
Pragmatic Method,” my third chapter, will address the implications and byproducts 
of Dewey’s rendering of experience and inquiry by explicating Dewey’s term 
“growth” as it is expressed in what he called “habit reconstruction.” There, I will also 
address the anticipated tensions that might surround my reading of these conceptions 
as Dewey’s means for reconstructing the method of philosophical investigation that 
he called, alternately, pragmatism and instrumentalism. 
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CHAPTER ONE – EXPERIENCE: THE FORMATION OF CONTEXT 
Reference to the primacy and ultimacy of the material of ordinary experience protects us 
from creating artificial problems which deflect the energy and attention of philosophers from 
the real problems that arise out of actual subject-matter. [EN, LW 1:26] 
The “Subject-Matter” of Philosophy 
 
Dewey was not the first philosopher to stress the importance of experience to 
philosophical study; neither was he first pragmatist to do so. In fact, both Peirce and 
James believed experience played a vital role in the application of the pragmatic 
method. In “The Development of American Pragmatism,” Dewey attributed the 
origin of pragmatism to a passage in Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals, happened upon 
by Peirce, wherein,  
Kant established a distinction between pragmatic and practical. The 
latter term applies to moral laws which Kant regards as a priori, 
whereas the former term applies to the rules of art and technique 
which are based on experience and are applicable to experience.9
 
In a collection of his lectures, published under the title Pragmatism (1907), William 
James acknowledged the Kantian roots of pragmatism, but also pointed to the 
etymology of the word – one he attributed to ancient Greece – in order to show that 
pragmatism “harmonizes with many ancient philosophic tendencies.”10 He hoped to 
                                                 
9 LW 2:3 
10 James, William. “What Pragmatism Means.” from Pragmatism and Other Writings. (New York: 
Penguin Classics) 2000. pg. 28 As James put it elsewhere, “There is absolutely nothing new in the 
pragmatic method. Socrates was an adept at it. Aristotle used it methodically. Locke, Berkeley, and 
Hume made momentous contributions to truth by its means.” pg. 27 
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identify philosophical investigation, as such, with the “empiricist attitude” that 
“unstiffens” theories and sets inquiry “at work” within the stream of [one’s] 
experience.11 He dubbed his position “radical empiricism” and wrote that for those 
who would adopt it “the crudity of experience remains an eternal element [of the 
world] thereof. There is no possible point of view from which the world can appear 
an absolutely single fact.”12 Any analysis of Dewey’s notion of experience must start 
from an explication of this position, for it was James’ sentiment that philosophical 
debates be reducible to terms about experience that was perhaps the single greatest 
influence on Dewey’s thought. James’ position might best be understood as the view 
that experience is something that we cannot go beyond, i.e. experience is all we have 
and there is nothing real outside of it. And, although James’ view of experience was 
now broader in scope than Peirce had originally seen it, it was based on a similar 
rejection of the Enlightenment view that saw experience as the locus of interaction 
between the objective world and the subjective perceiver – a distinction Dewey also 
rejected. As he put it, 
What has been completely divided in philosophical discourse into 
man and world, inner and outer, self and not-self, subject and 
object, individual and social, private and public, etc. are actually 
parties in life-transactions. The philosophical ‘problem’ of trying to 
get them back together is artificial.13
 
He believed that experience and the problems that arise out of it are neither merely 
the beginning of knowledge, nor a useful tool for linking up mind with world, but 
rather, the entire subject-matter of philosophy. He hoped that he could save 
                                                 
11 Ibid. pg. 28 
12 The Works of William James. Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 17 vol., 1975 
– The Will to Believe, pg. 6 
13  LW 16:248 
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philosophy from itself by removing the various artifices of dualisms and, in this 
regard, his work on experience could be seen as a type of “prolegomena” to any 
future epistemology. Thus, what Dewey meant by the term “experience” differed 
significantly from the way many of his predecessors and contemporaries had used it, 
i.e. as the influx of sensory data.  
In several of his early essays, Dewey laid the foundation for the more robust 
interpretation of experience, exemplified by Experience and Nature (1925) and Art 
as Experience (1934), which he hoped would redeem the term by having it “returned 
to its idiomatic usages.” 14 But here, idiom is not tantamount to vulgarity or 
simplicity. Rather, Dewey sought a return to thinking about experience in less 
dissected, philosophically abstract terms. Terms that would avoid many of the 
conceptual eddies that had plagued philosophy for centuries. For him, the progress of 
philosophy had been stagnated by those eddies, and he hoped to reconstruct it by 
reminding us “that philosophy must not be a study of philosophy, but a study, by 
means of philosophy, of life-experience and our beliefs about and in this 
experience.”15  
Dewey’s project was aimed at this goal, and he sought to accomplish it by 
showing how experience is inextricably linked with context. By his lights, experience 
sets the stage for understanding context, i.e. a proper illustration of experience can 
                                                 
14 cf. LW 1:361-3 
15 John J. Stuhr, “John Dewey.” in Pragmatism and Classical American Philosophy: Essential 
Readings and Interpretive Essays. Ed. John J. Stuhr (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.) pg. 
435  
NOTE: “Philosophy,” as it appears in this sentence, refers to three separate human enterprises, each 
used by Dewey in a specific sense. The first refers to philosophy in its professional capacity; the 
second refers to the philosophical problems of history; and the third refers to the reconstructed 
endeavor that Dewey wanted to imbue with experimentalism.   
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disclose or “lay bare” contextual frameworks. Of course, in order to demonstrate 
such a thesis, more clarification of 1) Dewey’s account of experience and 2) what he 
meant by the term context are needed. I am confident that once these concepts are 
clear, we will see that experience is best understood as the opening up, or 
engendering, of contextual transactions. However, first it may be helpful to recount 
some of the major movements in Dewey’s thought that led to the development of the 
first measure of his naturalism, i.e. the casting of psychological states in terms of the 
interaction between organisms and environments.   
Developing a Naturalistic Account 
 
Although Dewey’s account of experience could be characterized as a 
decisive break from previous outlooks, it did not arise in a vacuum. Throughout his 
lengthy career, Dewey came into contact with many different views, such as 
Darwinian naturalism, Kantian and Hegelian idealism, German romanticism, and 
perhaps most notably British empiricism. He tackled any new idea with enthusiasm, 
even in his later years, and was able to glean a great deal from each. But, the last 
twenty-five years of Dewey’s life, the period in which he most completely conveyed 
his version of pragmatism, hinged upon an empiricism that could be called 
“naturalistic” (though Dewey preferred the term instrumentalist) and which moved 
beyond any single influence, even beyond James’ radical empiricism. Briefly stated, 
Dewey’s naturalism hinges upon the notion that human beings can best be 
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understood through their relationships with their surroundings.16 The upshot of this 
naturalistic empiricism is the belief that thought and action are two parts of a single 
process and that “mind” and “world” name philosophical abstractions rather than 
existent entities. As he put it, “The nature of experience is determined by the 
essential conditions of life. While man is other than bird and beast, he shares basic 
vital functions with them and has to make the same basal adjustments if he is to 
continue the process of living.”17 In what follows, I sketch some of the major 
developments in Dewey’s thinking towards this position.   
As an undergraduate at the University of Vermont, Dewey had been 
impressed with Kant’s philosophy. His earliest publication, “The Metaphysical 
Assumptions of Materialism”(1882), reflected the Kantian tendency to convert 
metaphysical problems to epistemological ones when he criticized materialists for 
being logically inconsistent, viz. that “They claim to possess a certain kind of 
knowledge, but are unable to explain the derivation of that knowledge on a strictly 
materialistic basis.”18 However, Dewey soon came to move beyond this affinity for 
epistemologically grounded philosophy as he was introduced to Hegel as a graduate 
student at Johns Hopkins University. The time spent on Kant, though, was never 
fully forgotten, as became obvious in later writings where Dewey often returned to 
the notion of mediated knowledge. 
                                                 
16 Dewey’s brand of naturalism is a precursor to later versions, which argued for describing mental 
phenomenon in the terms of natural science, expounded by thinkers such as W.V.O. Quine and 
Donald Davidson.   
17 AE, LW 10:19 
18 Boisvert, Raymond. Dewey’s Metaphysics. New York: Fordham University Press, 1988. pg. 17 
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The individual who had the greatest impact on Dewey’s thought as a graduate 
student at Johns Hopkins, and who helped him beyond Kant, was the neo-Hegelian 
scholar G.S. Morris. However, Morris’ brand of Hegelianism was unique in that it 
rejected the dialectic of Geist in favor of a more biological description of the 
dynamism of nature. In other words, the traditional “subject” in epistemology 
became redefined as an organism fully immersed in and interacting with a dynamic, 
organic environment – i.e. one that incorporates the organism. This move, which was 
vital to Dewey’s later thought, came to Morris from his mentor Trendelenburg, who 
had been sharply influenced by Aristotle’s notion of potentiality-actuality and 
Darwin’s theory of evolution. Trendelenburg synthesized these two ideas into what 
he called “constructive motion” which he saw as the common trait between thought 
and being. On one hand, thought moves from potentiality to actuality, per Aristotle, 
as it becomes the object that is thought, on the other hand, being moves from 
potentiality to actuality, per Darwin, through natural selection. This reading renders 
the notion of telos a type of biological end in both nature and organisms.19 Dewey’s 
teacher Morris, in turn, appropriated these ideas in his own work as he aimed at 
detailing the meaning of existence and the undermining of dualisms. Dewey later 
echoed the biologized Hegelianism of Trendelenberg and Morris in Experience and 
Nature, with passages such as,  
If we consider the form or scheme of the situation in which meaning 
and understanding occur, we find an involved simultaneous presence 
and cross-reference of immediacy and efficiency, overt actuality and 
potentiality, the consummatory and instrumental.20
                                                 
19 For a more detailed description of Trendelenburg’s “constructive motion” see Boisvert, Raymond. 
Dewey’s Metaphysics. New York: Fordham University Press, 1988. pgs. 22-24 
20 EN, LW 1:143 
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During these early stages in his career, Dewey’s move from Kant to Hegel can best 
be characterized as a shift from epistemology to ontology. The difference is the way 
he dealt with the relationship between mind and world, viz. a shift from a dualistic 
view to a more holistic one. 
In 1903, Dewey published Studies in Logical Theory, which is commonly 
taken to be his definitive break from idealism toward experimentalism. However, the 
foundations for this volume were worked out gradually over the course of the 
preceding years as Dewey became less captivated by Hegelianism. The two largest 
contributing factors in Dewey’s empirical turn were his work at Johns Hopkins with 
the psychologist G. Stanley Hall, who showed him how scientific analysis could be 
applied to the humanities, and his later collaboration with J.H. Tufts at the 
University of Michigan. Dewey left Michigan to join Tufts at the University of 
Chicago and it was there that he developed a philosophical approach that coalesced 
pragmatism with his Darwinian leanings, viz. instrumentalism. Over the following 
ten years, Dewey flourished in this environment as he worked out the implications of 
combining Peirce’s pragmatism, James’ radical empiricism and Darwinian 
naturalism with a scientific approach. Briefly stated, the upshot of combining these 
three schools of thought was that while nature was in constant change, human 
beings could still act in their environment by testing their beliefs and adjusting them 
according to usefulness in experience. In other words, if human beings observe, 
through experimentation, what actions are best, then they will form "good laboratory 
habits." These habits share a normative feature with Kant's  
 
14 
universal maxim, i.e. those that can be applied by all inquirers, are best. Moral 
imperatives, then, refer to some tried and tested method, not “an ideal drawn from 
the blue.”21
Dewey’s work is unique insofar as it took these already established ideas, 
assimilated them with others, and built upon them an outlook that, when understood 
properly, coalesced the seemingly disparate functions of experience, inquiry, and 
learning. In this way, it could be argued, his mature view (exemplified by 
Experience and Nature and Art as Experience) aimed at giving insight into what it 
means to be human. Two early essays in particular laid the foundation for that more 
robust expression of experience.  
When the first of these essays, “The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology,” 
appeared in 1896, it marked “one of the truly important turning points in the study of 
human behavior.”22 There, Dewey attacked the mechanistic view of stimulus and 
response that dominated the psychological research of the period. On his view, the 
reflex arc concept only mimicked an older, and erroneous, mind-body dualism by 
placing stimulus in opposition to response. He wrote,  
 …we still incline to interpret the latter [i.e. response] from our 
preconceived and preformulated ideas of rigid distinctions between 
sensations, thoughts and acts. The sensory stimulus is one thing, the 
central activity, standing for the idea, is another thing, and the 
motor discharge, standing for the act proper, is a third. As a result, 
the reflex arc is not a comprehensive, or organic unity, but a 
                                                 
21 LTI, LW 12:108 
22 cf. EW 5:XVIII [William McKenzie’s introduction the fifth volume of Dewey’s Early Works] 
where McKenzie continued with, “It remained for decades one of the most influential works in the 
science of psychology and still retains that position among all students not dogmatically committed to 
some form, by whatever name, of the same mechanistic view that it attempts to correct.”    
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patchwork of disjointed parts, a mechanical conjunction of unallied 
processes.23
 
In this regard, Dewey complained, the reflex arc was inaccurate because it placed the 
parts of an act prior to the whole. It failed to recognize that stimulus, movement, and 
response only made sense as an interpretation of an event after it had occurred. 
Moreover, he claimed, that the notions of stimulus and response were non-existent 
entities that only gain meaning once placed in relation to one another. Simply put, 
Dewey argued that the reflex arc was an instance of the empiricist’s fallacy of 
placing the parts prior to the whole.  
Dewey offered a more naturalistic account, one that viewed stimulus and 
response in less mechanistic terms, i.e. as parts of a single process. On such a view, 
the reflex arc does not run in a linear direction from stimulus, through response, to 
movement. Rather, multiple stimuli, responses, and movements arise simultaneously 
and are experienced, in chorus, as a singular, unbroken act, “which is as experienced 
no more mere sensation than it is mere motion,” and thus, when analysis dissects the 
reflex arc into separate states, “we have, only the serial steps in a co-ordination of 
acts.” 24 Simply put, before an act can be divided into parts, its quality as a whole has 
to be explicated. But, the reflex arc concept offered no such explanation.     
Toward the close of the 19th century, as Dewey began to embrace 
pragmatism, he became enamored with James’ radical empiricism and began to 
formulate his own version, which, by 1905, he had dubbed “immediate 
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empiricism.”25 His essay, “The Postulate of Immediate Empiricism,” which appeared 
in July of that year, reveals James’ influence on his thinking. Therein, Dewey’s 
postulate was aimed at framing all philosophical debate in terms of experience, on 
the one hand, and eradicating the notion that experience needs to be grounded in a 
transcendent reality or a transcendental truth absolutely free from time and 
contingency, on the other. As he put it, “things – anything, everything, in the 
ordinary non-technical use of the term “thing” – are what they are experienced as.”26 
To illustrate this, Dewey described a situation where a person, sitting in a dark room, 
might hear a noise that frightens them. When the lights are turned on and the 
harmless source of the noise identified, rather than saying that the noise appeared 
frightful and was really harmless, Dewey suggested that we ought to identify the 
noise as truly frightful when first heard, and later – because more information is 
available to apply to the gross experience – it is truly harmless. Saying the latter 
would be more useful than positing, as someone who used the former explanation 
would, a distinction between appearances and reality. Dewey wanted to make it clear 
that the experienced noise was just what it was experienced as at that time, namely 
frightening. On this account, “if one wishes to describe anything truly, his task is to 
tell what it is experienced as being.”27 Compare this with a passage from James’ The 
Meaning of Truth (1909):  
Radical empiricism consists first of a postulate… that the only 
things debatable among philosophers shall be things definable in 
terms of experience…. The generalized conclusion is that therefore 
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the parts of experience hold together from next to next by relations 
that are themselves parts of experience.28
 
This passage, on the one hand, illustrates the parallel between these two thinker’s 
views. On the other hand, insofar as James had adopted Dewey’s reference to a 
postulate, it may suggest the admiration that Dewey felt for James was probably 
mutual. In any case, what is clear is that by the release of the “The Postulate of 
Immediate Empiricism” Dewey’s thought had come into its own.  
  Another example that Dewey used in that article was “Zöllner’s illusion” – an 
optical illusion displaying lines that appear to be convergent, yet are “truly” parallel. 
 
 
Opponents of Dewey’s view might use this picture as an example of how describing 
something in terms of “experiencing as” does not do justice to the nature of the 
experienced object. To this Dewey responds,  
That experience is that two lines with certain cross-hatchings are 
apprehended as convergent; only by taking that experience as real 
and as fully real, is there any basis for or way of going to an 
experienced knowledge that the lines are parallel. It is in the 
concrete thing as experienced that all the grounds and clues to its 
own intellectual or logical rectification are contained.29
 
The last sentence of this passage reveals that Dewey agreed with James that the 
generalized conclusion of this postulate was that “[t]he directly apprehended universe 
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needs… no extraneous transempirical connective support.”30 Thus, with the 
appearance of the “Postulate” paper Dewey had, once and for all, rejected the 
subjective, psychical view of experience and the subsequent division of knowing 
from the known that was prevalent in much of his early work. Elements of James’ 
view could still be found in Dewey’s work twenty years later when he wrote in the 
first chapter of his Experience and Nature,  
When objects are isolated from the experience through which they 
are reached and in which they function, experience itself becomes 
reduced to the mere process of experiencing, and experiencing is 
therefore treated as if it were also complete in itself.31
 
Dewey warned against the enterprise of “selective emphasis” – i.e. the tendency to 
emphasize the parts of experience that are clearest or most important. When 
philosophers are not mindful of this tendency they may end up positing intellectual 
abstractions as absolute being. This “conversion of eventual functions into antecedent 
existence” is what Dewey called “the philosophic fallacy”.32 In order to avoid 
committing this fallacy in regard to experience itself, Dewey sought to map out only 
its generic traits. Doing this, he believed would render a coherent account without 
spinning off into abstractions.  
Mapping Out Experience 
 
For the last half of his life, Dewey aimed at reinstating a more natural, 
holistic view of experience that was rooted in the recognition of the 
interconnectedness of perceiver and surroundings. He believed this view of 
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experience and the problems that arose out of avoiding this view were the subject 
matter of all philosophical study. 
Other [philosophic] methods begin with results of a reflection 
that has already torn in two the subject-matter experienced and 
the operations and states of experiencing. The problem then is to 
get together again what has been sundered – which is as if the 
king’s men started with the fragments of the egg and tried to 
construct the whole egg out of them.33
 
By his lights, a vision of experience that emphasized the interconnection of perceiver 
and world could answer the original, basic questions of philosophy (questions such 
as “Who are we?” “Where do we come from?” “Where are we going?” etc.) without 
drawing false distinctions between inner and outer realms. This had been the strategy 
adopted by many of the ancient Greek philosophers, and Dewey followed their lead, 
especially in his later writings. For it was the logical outcome of a metaphysical 
position that, à la Aristotle and many pre-Socratics, placed the concept of “being” in 
opposition to that of “becoming,” rather than “nothingness.” By the time Dewey 
began composing Experience and Nature, he had fully adopted this line of thought, 
as evidenced by his second chapter, “Existence as Precarious and Stable.” On such 
an account experience becomes a singular, holistic affair precisely “because the 
interaction of live creature and environing conditions is involved in the very process 
of living.”34 However, according to Dewey, questions arose in the course of hundreds 
of years of philosophic inquiry because experience can always be turned inward on 
itself, it can be analyzed. “[T]he act of observation may be inquired into and form a 
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subject of study and become thereby a refined object of study.”35 As he charged, the 
result of such introspection, most often identified with Modern philosophy, is the 
tendency to draw distinctions, to separate experience into primary and secondary 
components, into the “experienced” and the “experiencing.” He rejected this 
tendency. As he wrote in 1917,  
…it is just the inherited view of experience common to the 
empirical school and its opponents [i.e. the rationalist school] 
which keeps alive many discussions even of matters that are on 
their face quite remote from it, while it is also this view which is 
most untenable in the light of existing science and social practice.36
 
Therefore he argued, contra British empiricism, that primary experience alone (i.e. 
the stream of sensory perceptions) is, by itself, ipso facto insufficient for analysis 
because of the very capacity for reflection that human beings possess, and, contra 
rationalism, that the notion of innate ideas is merely the result of a “bias toward 
treating objects selected because of their value in some special context as the 
‘real.’”37 As he saw it, 
For reflection the eventual is always better or worse than the given. 
But since it would also be better if the eventual good were now given, 
the philosopher, belonging by status to a leisure class relieved from 
the urgent necessity of dealing with conditions, converts the eventual 
into some kind of Being, something which is, even if does not exist… 
Reflection determining preference for an eventual good has 
dialectically wrought a miracle of transubstantiation…38  
 
The traditional subject-matter of philosophy, then, has either been experience (as a 
result of philosophical reflection) or attempts to solve the subsequent splintering of 
experience at the hands of reflection. More importantly, the problem philosophy 
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must solve, if it ever hopes to recover its grip on the real world, is how to reunite the 
pieces of experience that have been “torn asunder,” viz. perception and reflection. 
Dewey tried to reunite these two by mapping out the natural, or “generic,” traits of 
experience, which, “taken free of the restrictions imposed by other concepts, is full of 
inference.  There is, apparently, no conscious experience without inference; 
reflection is native and constant.”39 He hoped that these traits would show perception 
and reflection to be inseparable. For him, the “immense diversity of human affairs, 
interests, concerns, values which compartmentalists pigeonhole under ‘religion’ 
‘aesthetics’ ‘politics’ ‘economics’ etc., etc.” all share the same character of a 
integrated, transactional relationship between human beings and their surroundings. 
And, it was this general character that Dewey wanted to capture with his use of the 
term ‘experience.’ 
 To compose a complete list of the generic traits of experience that Dewey 
proposed would prove difficult. While perhaps the most extensive treatment of these 
traits can be found in Experience and Nature, Dewey never offered an exhaustive 
account. He would often seemingly create new ones, ad hoc, in order to make a point 
in some other line of argumentation. But, this may be explained when considered in 
light of the goal Dewey had in mind when introducing these traits, viz. to 
demonstrate how experience could be seen as inherently tied to culture. This point is 
of vital importance for his overall project, though one which has remained unclear in 
secondary literature. On one hand, Dewey’s seemingly egalitarian acceptance of 
cultures, even those wildly different from one another, might appear too culturally 
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relativistic to potential critics. In this regard, his vague presentation of the traits of 
experience could be cited as evidence. On the other hand, to attempt a 
comprehensive list of such traits would undermine the naturalistic conception of 
experience that Dewey hoped to put on the gold standard. After all, if experience is a 
natural affair, then it must adapt to changes in the environment, which would amount 
to most of its generic traits being wholly contingent. When understood 
naturalistically, i.e. as an organism’s method of negotiating it’s way through an 
environment, the once limited concept of experience could be tied together with the 
broader concept of culture. With this in mind, I will briefly list only those traits that 
Dewey emphasized most and were most central to his notion of experience, rather 
than attempt to enumerate each of the generic traits that he identified in experience.  
 Perhaps the two most important traits of experience for Dewey would be 
change and continuity. He characterized the first as being “eventful,” “precarious,” 
and “hazardous.”  I have chosen “change” as a catchall for these descriptions. This 
could best be summed up by the doctrine of universal flux attributed to the pre-
Socratic philosopher Heraclitus. However, it is important to note that the mantra 
“One cannot step into the same river twice,” so often associated with this doctrine, 
only partially represents the Heraclitean view. This version of the statement lends 
itself to the interpretation that all things are changing at all times and that even those 
things which appear stable are merely in a slower process of flux, one that escapes 
observation. But, on such an interpretation, since a river is constantly changing, one 
could not even step into the same river once. As recent scholarship has suggested, 
what Heraclitus may have meant when he wrote, “On those stepping into rivers 
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staying the same other and other waters flow,” (Diels-Kranz B22) was that although 
different waters flow through a river, the river itself stays the same. And, more 
importantly, it is only by virtue of the flow that there is even a river at all instead of a 
pond or lake.40 There is a governing form, in this case that of a river, that bounds the 
moments of change and connects them. When understood this way, the doctrine of 
universal flux jibes well with Dewey’s notion of change within experience. It is by 
virtue of the hazards and uncertainties that color experience, that the live creature has 
any experience at all. As Dewey put it,  
The doctrine of [Heraclitus], while it held that all things flow like a 
river and that change is so continuous that a man cannot step into 
the same river even once (since it changes as he steps), nevertheless 
also held that there is a fixed order which controls the ebb and flow 
of the universal tide.41
 
This “fixed order” is what led Dewey to posit continuity as a generic trait of 
experience. On such a view, experience is not at all atomistic, but rather is “pregnant 
with connections,” i.e. experience continuously flows from one part to the next – it is 
not simply a succession of events. This continuity, or “stability,” is of vital 
importance to experience, without it the moments of change would spill over into 
chaos. As Dewey wrote in Art as Experience, “To overpass the limits that are set is 
destruction and death… In a world of mere flux, change would not be cumulative; it 
would not move toward a close. Stability and rest would have no being.”42 But, this 
order is not fixed in the sense of being static; it is dynamic and rhythmic, “fixed” in 
                                                 
40 cf. Wheelwright, Philip Ellis. Heraclitus. New York: Oxford University Press, 1968. pgs. 29-36. 
and "Heraclitus," by Daniel W. Graham, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, www.iep.utm.edu/, 
February 4th 2005. 
41 LW 14:101 
42 AE, LW 10:22 
 
24 
the sense of being directed and connective. Again, Dewey wrote, “All interactions 
that effect stability and order in the whirling flux of change are rhythms. There is ebb 
and flow, systole and diastole: ordered change. The latter moves within bounds.”43 
Elsewhere, Dewey likened the notion of continuity to a variable that remains 
constant in a mathematical equation, and as it is in math, he claimed, “so it is in 
nature and life.”44  
 However, it is important to note that the movement “toward a close” to which 
Dewey alluded does not signify a move toward some ultimate end. Rather, for 
Dewey, it is a move toward an intermediate “end-in-view” which is itself, along with 
the means to attain it, still a part of experience. In this way, according to Dewey, 
experience is also historical, i.e. it has narrative characteristics which seem to raise 
particular events above the otherwise continuous flow of moments. An averted 
catastrophe, a meal enjoyed in Paris, a storm passed through on an oversea voyage, 
all exemplify the type of event which Dewey called, “an experience.” Such an event 
is historical insofar as, “the points of its incidence shift in successive observations of 
it… It carries on and is, therefore, instrumental as well as final.”45 Each of these 
experiences has a unique quality that defies communication, some attribute that is 
wholly immediate and therefore not an object of knowledge. Compare this with the 
postulate of immediate empiricism that “things are what they are experienced as” and 
it becomes clear that these qualities are not subjective, they belong, as Dewey 
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asserted, both to the thing experienced and the one experiencing them. Dewey 
claimed that,     
In such experiences, every successive part flows freely, without 
seam and without unfilled blanks, into what ensues. At the same 
time there is no sacrifice of the self-identity of the parts. A river, as 
distinct from a pond, flows. But its flow gives a definiteness and 
interest to its successive portions greater than exist in the 
homogenous portions of a pond. In an experience, flow is from 
something to something.46  
 
Accordingly, experience consists, writ-large, of innumerably intertwined beginnings 
and endings in which these types of affairs may arise. Selective interest allows us to 
pick out which moments we will bundle up together out of the continuous flow to 
call an experience. When this happens, meaning is imparted to the event and it 
becomes communicative insofar as it directs us back to something beyond itself, 
namely the background of surrounding moments. Thus, another generic trait of 
experience is communication, or expression. The immediacy of the event is unified 
and heightened by the stable order of expression. Dewey tells us this is life in its 
most robust form.  
Experience in the degree in which it is experience is heightened 
vitality. Instead of signifying being shut up within one's own private 
feelings and sensations, it signifies active and alert commerce with 
the world; at its height it signifies complete interpenetration of self 
and the world of objects and events. Instead of signifying surrender 
to caprice and disorder, it affords our sole demonstration of a 
stability that is not stagnation but is rhythmic and developing.47
 
Dewey refers to these heightened moments as “consummatory experiences.” But, the 
ambiguous verb “to consummate” and its noun derivative “consummation” can be 
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misleading. On one hand, these can mean closure in the sense of completion or 
culmination as in “the consummation of marriage.” On the other hand, the verb can 
become an adjective that refers to something that is complete in the sense of needing 
no qualification, as in (pejoratively) “the consummate fool,” and it is this latter 
meaning, i.e. “without qualification,” that Dewey wished to evoke. A consummatory 
experience, on his view, is a grouping of moments that stand out from the rest of 
experience, like a great meal, a terrible storm, or a beautiful sculpture. Dewey called 
such a grouping “an experience” because it needs no further qualification. It stands 
alone as a representative of the rest of the moments surrounding it. These 
consummatory experiences serve as exemplars that structure our experience into 
manageable components, and since reflecting upon every moment in experience 
would prove impossible, we could not reflect upon anything at all without this 
ordered structure. That is not to say, however, that once an experience reaches 
consummation, that it has come to an end, but rather, as Dewey claimed, “The time 
of consummation is also one of beginning anew.”48 Consummatory experiences, 
then, are pauses, not breaks, in the continuity of experience. This is how a rhythmic 
order is established. 
In rhythmic ordering, every close and pause, like the rest in music, 
connects as well as delimits and individualizes. A pause in music is 
not a blank, but is a rhythmic silence that punctuates what is done 
while at the same time it conveys an impulsion forward, instead of 
arresting at the point which it defines.49
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But, this rhythmic order is not merely established temporally, “The proportionate 
interception of changes establishes an order that is spatially… patterned,” as well.50 
If musical rhythm is the temporal analog to consummatory experience, then the 
spatial analog might be the rhythm of ocean waves. Each trough delimits each wave 
crest, but to say that waves are separated by troughs would belie fluid dynamics. On 
the micro level, water molecules are all connected in a processional, circular 
movement, on the macro level, troughs flow into waves and call attention to them, 
giving significance to each. If we understand this connection and are able to 
internalize it, we will operate with our surroundings more harmoniously. As Dewey 
put it,  
Contrast of lack and fullness, of struggle and achievement, of 
adjustment after consummated irregularity, form the drama in 
which action, feeling, and meaning are one… Inner harmony is 
made only when, by some means, terms are made with the 
environment.51   
 
Because these consummatory experiences are dynamic, i.e. they move through 
experience with us, they can always be re-evaluated. The consummatory phase, 
therefore, is an ongoing process, it has duration and recurrence, and it can rise and 
subside in relation to the flow of experience. This feature of experience, that it can be 
consummatory, illustrates the formation of context. As Dewey wrote in “Context and 
Thought,” an essay that sits in his career roughly halfway between Experience and 
Nature and Art as Experience, “Context includes at least those matters which for 
brevity I shall call background and selective interest… Background is both temporal 
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and spatial.”52 In what follows I will explicate how consummatory experience leads 
to the formation of context and what Dewey meant by calling context a 
‘background.’ 
Experience and Context 
 
What is of the greatest importance for Dewey’s account of experience is the 
context within which the experience takes place. But, what exactly is context? In 
Dewey’s philosophy it is,  
…the whole environment of which philosophy must take account in 
all its enterprises. A background is implicit in some form and to 
some degree in all thinking, although as background it does not 
come into explicit purview; that is, it does not form a portion of the 
subject matter which is consciously attended to, thought of, 
examined, inspected, turned over.53
   
But, merely calling it a background, offers little in the way of clarification. Dewey 
identified three manifestations of the background he referred to as context, each 
corresponding to a particular type of interaction within experience.  
The first manifestation of context, according to Dewey’s account, arises from 
the physical interaction of creatures with environments. The context of this 
interaction is the organism itself. As Dewey argued, the context of any experience is 
both organic, i.e. it is of and related to an experiencing organism, or “live creature,” 
as well as holistic, i.e. its organic aspects should not be separated from non-organic 
ones. He wrote,  
The organism, self, ego, subject, give it whatever name you choose, 
is implicated in all thinking as in all eating, business, or play. Since 
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it cannot in its entirety be made an explicit object of reflection and 
yet since it affects all matters thought of, it is legitimately called a 
phase of context.54
 
But, as we have seen, Dewey rejected the distinction between subject and object, and 
his use of terms commonly associated with subjectivity should therefore not be 
construed as a moment of hedging. He used these terms in this passage in order to 
distinguish between subjectivity understood as a kind of “view from nowhere” and 
subjectivity as a “determining attitude” or “interest.” Of the former he claimed, “A 
standpoint which is nowhere in particular and from which things are not seen at a 
special angle is an absurdity,” and of the latter, “Interest, as the subjective, is after all 
equivalent to individuality or uniqueness.”55 The difference, according to Dewey, 
arises out of a special characteristic of subjectivity, viz. that although it is involved in 
all thinking it can never itself fully be made into an object of thought.56 Subjectivity 
in this second sense, i.e. as selective interest, then, is a phase of context. Again, 
Dewey warns against letting selective interest run amok in philosophical thought,  
Thinking is always thinking, but philosophic thinking is, upon the 
whole, at the extreme end of the scale of distance from the active 
urgency of concrete situations. It is because of this fact that neglect 
of context is the besetting fallacy of philosophical thought.57
 
But, as we saw above, selective interest is necessary in order to form a 
consummatory experience. So if we want to avoid letting selective interest run amok, 
it would seem, then, that selective interest is only desirable up to a limit. Dewey 
argued that selecting out of specific contexts, such as selecting a particularly good 
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meal out of the context of a Parisian vacation, only becomes a problem when it is 
converted “into abstraction from all context whatsoever.”58 This raises an issue of 
inclusion. Dewey implies that it is possible to select out of a particular context and 
yet still have that which has been selected be included within some still wider 
context. As we have seen, when the appropriate amount of selective interest is 
applied to the continuous flow of experiential moments “an experience” is formed. 
The ensuing background of that consummatory experience represents the second 
manifestation of context, viz. the background of consummatory experiences as such 
which arises out of the psychophysical interaction of experience that is known as 
reflection. 
If selective interest leads both to the formulation of consummatory experience 
and to context, then it would seem that experience is, in the very least, intimately 
related to context. But, Dewey claimed that in the most general terms, they are not 
merely related but are actually identical. As he put it, “If the finally significant 
business of philosophy is the disclosure of the context of beliefs, then we cannot 
escape the conclusion that experience is the name for the last inclusive context.”59 In 
this broad sense, experience and context are synonymous. However, since Dewey 
saw experience as a matter of interaction between organisms and environments, 
perhaps a better word for context in this regard would be “culture.” And, if we 
understand culture as any particular group’s body of knowledge and values, each of 
which involves belief, then the “business of philosophy” would be the disclosure of 
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culture. Understood in this way, experience bestows meaning on an environment, 
meaning that can be transmitted to later generations. Once experience in general has 
gained these communicative, contextual qualities it can open up the possibility for 
new, less inclusive, contexts. As a result of this communicative interaction within 
experience, culture would represent the third and most inclusive manifestation of 
context. As Dewey wrote in an unfinished revision to the first chapter of Experience 
and Nature,  
The name "culture" in its anthropological…sense designates the 
vast range of things experienced in an indefinite variety of ways. It 
possesses as a name just that body of substantial references which 
"experience" as a name has lost.60
 
And, elsewhere he wrote,  
  
Were I to write (or rewrite) Experience and Nature today I would 
entitle the book Culture and Nature…because of my growing 
realization that the historical obstacles which prevented 
understanding of my use of “experience” are, for all practical 
purposes, insurmountable. …“culture” designates…that immense 
diversity of human affairs.61       
 
Thus, for Dewey, such a view can be summed up in the single word - 
“contextualism”. By making human affairs the primary focus of his empirical 
method, Dewey alleviated the need for explaining reality in its absolute form. 
Accordingly, subsequent transformations within philosophic inquiry can be viewed 
within the context of whatever problems are most pressing. This led Dewey to 
formulate a detailed account of inquiry, and it is that concept to which I will now 
turn. 
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CHAPTER TWO – INQUIRY: THE ENRICHMENT OF CONTEXT 
The search for the pattern of inquiry is, accordingly, not one instituted in the dark. It is 
checked and controlled by knowledge of the kinds of inquiry that have and have not worked; 
methods which…can be so compared as to yield reasoned or rational conclusions. [LTI, LW 
12:108] 
The Search for a Pattern 
 
 In the preceding chapter, the first measure of Dewey’s naturalism – that 
psychological states can be reduced to the interactions of organisms and 
environments within life-experience – was shown to be the genesis of what he called 
context. Furthermore, it was argued that context, in this naturalistic sense, is 
synonymous with a broad conception of culture. However, prima facie, this point is 
still lacking in several facets. First, it fails to explain, given that human beings are so 
nearly identical in biological terms, why there are a multitude of cultures throughout 
the world, often co-existing in the same environment. Second, if experience and 
culture are indeed interchangeable, then it remains to be seen how experience could 
be characterized in terms of environment manipulation/accommodation – something 
implicit in the notion of culture. Third, this account renders context a vague and 
amorphous concept, one hardly instructive enough to be called ‘culture’ in anything 
but the broadest sense. However, according to Dewey, accounting for how an 
organism probes into a particular problem, viz. a ‘pattern of inquiry,’ could assuage 
all of these concerns. Since solving problems, on his view, is itself a part of 
experience – albeit a specialized part – he first thought to explicate his theory of 
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inquiry by presenting how it showed up within the various functional conditions, or 
“modes,” of experience. These modes are, according to Dewey, natural conditions 
that determine how organisms deal with the “instability” and “precariousness” of 
experience.  
In his earliest text concerning inquiry, Studies in Logical Theory (1903), 
Dewey set out on this project. There, he raised “important questions about the 
relations between dominantly aesthetic, moral and affectional modes and subject-
matters of experience and the cognitional mode and its specific subject-matter.”62 
That volume marked the beginning of what Joseph Ratner, in 1939, referred to as 
Dewey’s recasting philosophy as a “general logic of experience.”63 Although, in that 
volume, Dewey made mention of a number of modes, he never offered a 
comprehensive list. Just as was argued in the previous chapter in reference to the 
generic traits of experience, this lack should not lead us to call Dewey’s account 
patchwork; rather, it should be seen as an initial exploration into a new type of logic, 
the broad strokes of which needed to be worked out prior to the details. In fact, the 
majority of Dewey’s works between the 1903 Studies volume and his Logic: The 
Theory of Inquiry (1938) could each be seen as working out the details of one of the 
activities (ethics, art, religion, science, and politics) that arise out of the diverse 
modes of experience (the moral, aesthetic, religious, cognitive, and practical) all of 
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which, taken together, comprise Dewey’s “general logic of experience.” “When we 
take Dewey’s works severally,” as Ratner put it, 
they very naturally group themselves into special (or specific) logics 
of the typical (or distinctive) modes of experience. Thus to mention 
only some of his representative works: Human Nature and Conduct 
is the special logic of the socio-ethical mode of experience; Art as 
Experience is the special logic of the esthetic mode; A Common 
Faith – of the religious; …The Quest for Certainty and Logic: The 
Theory of Inquiry – comprise the special logic of the scientific mode 
of experience; The Public and It’s Problems, Individualism Old and 
New, Liberalism and Social Action – comprise the socio-practical or 
utilitarian; …And finally Experience and Nature. [Therein] All 
modes of experience are naturally interconnected, being socio-
cultural differentiations of common experience.64
 
The insight of this passage deserves to be quoted at length. However, the last remark 
of the passage – that the diverse modes of experience are naturally interconnected – is 
perhaps the most informative. As Ratner explained, the modes of experience are, for 
Dewey, differentiations of a cultural kind, each of which imparts a specialized form 
of cultural “intelligence” interwoven into the fabric of common experience.  
Although Ratner’s account neatly ties together all of Dewey’s works between 
1903 and 1938, we are left wondering many things about the modes of experience. 
For instance, if we take seriously the notion that experience flows as a unified whole, 
then are the modes merely tributaries of this flow, and if so then how do they arise? 
Moreover, are the various modes on par with one another, or does any one in 
particular subsume the others? It seems that Dewey may have struggled with these 
questions as well. In 1934, Dewey published two major works, Art as Experience and 
A Common Faith, each devoted to a particular mode (the aesthetic and religious 
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respectively) of experience. But, when read in tandem, these volumes could be 
viewed as slightly contradictory, i.e. each seems to laud its particular topic as the 
highest mode of experience. That is to say, one feasible conclusion that could be 
drawn from Art as Experience is that all experience is aesthetic. Likewise, it could be 
argued that one of the underlying themes in A Common Faith is that all experience is 
religious. However, these interpretations fail to account for the distinction Dewey 
made between general experience and an experience, i.e. those that are 
consummatory. A consummatory experience, as Dewey argued, serves as a 
representation of the surrounding moments of experience at large. A particular 
consummation may be valuable in relation to any one of the modes, it may be 
valuable within several, or it may change in time. For example, we may find a 
particular work of art important for aesthetic and religious reasons in our first 
encounter with it, and then only in some later encounter find some ethical or political 
value in it. With such a distinction between experience in general and an experience 
in mind, however, it becomes clear that each work is aimed at laying out the various 
features of the latter. Interestingly, however, it was only four years after the release of 
those two volumes that Dewey completed Logic: The Theory of Inquiry. That volume 
contained a marked difference in its treatment of the modes of experience. On one 
hand, Dewey clearly had moved beyond discussing the modes of experience in detail, 
and, on the other, wherever he did allude to them, they were treated as a mere 
outcome of either “common sense” or “scientific” inquiry. The arguments put 
forward in Logic were, as he put it, 
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…intended to indicate that the different objectives of common 
sense and of scientific inquiry demand different subject-matters and 
that this difference in subject matters is not incompatible with the 
existence of a common pattern in both types.65  
           
Thus, it would seem that by 1938 Dewey had abandoned the project of outlining the 
modes of experience, which had been initiated by Studies in Logical Theory. In 
response to Ratner, Dewey commented that, “Dr. Ratner has put his finger upon the 
main ‘shift’ in my writings.” 66 Later in his response, Dewey responded to Ratner by 
highlighting the vital role that solving problems played for the development of his 
later work. 
… I should, from the start, have systematically distinguished 
between knowledge as the outcome of special inquiries 
(undertaken because of the presence of problems) and intelligence 
as the product and expression of cumulative funding of the 
meanings reached in these cases.67
Two points of clarification are called for here. The first is that there is a 
salient difference between knowledge and intelligence as “outcome” and “habit” of 
the cognitive mode of experience, and those that are the byproducts of non-cognitive 
modes. When taken as a product of these latter, non-cognitive modes, knowledge is 
strictly passive and intelligence manifests itself as a supplicatory method for dealing 
with problems, viz. “tradition” and all of the myths, rites, and superstitions that 
constitute it. On the other hand, when knowledge is the result of the cognitive (or 
scientific) mode, it is active, and intelligence manifests itself in the form of science 
and technology. This seems to answer the question of how different cultures can 
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respond to the same environment. Simply put, there are innumerable ways of coping 
with precariousness, but only one means for transforming it. 
The second point of clarification to be noted is that inquiry, understood in its 
broadest sense as the quality that all of the modes of experience share, only provides 
us with the type of intelligence that allow for the accommodation or avoidance of 
adversity. Although Dewey believed that everyday inquiry is continuous with the 
more specialized, cognitive type of inquiry, he argued that only the features 
displayed in scientific intelligence can “give expertness of dealing with materials and 
tools, and promote the development of the experimental habit of mind.”68 In other 
words, only a cognitive mode of experience patterned after science can equip us with 
a means of transforming the environment and resolving its perils. This is the second 
measure of Dewey’s mature naturalism, and it serves as an answer to the concern that 
experience has no inherent feature of responding to environment. Dewey’s account 
of this pattern, like that of his conception of experience, developed gradually over the 
course of his career. Throughout his work after 1903, Dewey referred to it by several 
names, e.g. “the empirical method,” “the new logic,” “experimentalism,” and “the 
pragmatic method.” However, toward the end of his career, he returned to the generic 
term ‘inquiry’ to encapsulate all of these. By 1938, Dewey admitted in the preface of 
Logic that this account  “does not have and could not have the finish and 
completeness that are theoretically possible.”69 But, he was convinced that it was “so 
thoroughly sound” that anyone who entertained it would, “develop a theory of logic 
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that is in thorough accord with all the best authenticated methods of attaining 
knowledge.”70 Unfortunately, his account of the modes of experience has, by and 
large, remained on the fringes of Deweyan scholarship. But, if we put stock in 
Ratner’s account, as Dewey himself seemed to, then we may view Dewey’s Logic 
volume as the culmination of a theme that ran throughout the last half of Dewey’s 
career, i.e. that inquiry leads to “a judgment of what to do, or what is to be done: a 
judgment respecting the future termination of an incomplete and in so far 
indeterminate situation.”71      
The Indeterminate Situation as Impoverished Context 
 
According to Dewey, everyday life is an activity that requires great skill, “We 
talk and read aloud, we get off and on street cars, we dress and undress, and do a 
thousand useful acts without thinking of them.”72 As we saw in the previous chapter, 
it was in Experience and Nature that Dewey first detailed the precarious features of 
experience within a dynamic environment. As he put it,  
Man finds himself living in an aleatory world; his existence 
involves, to put it baldly, a gamble. The world is a scene of risk; it 
is uncertain, unstable, uncannily unstable. Its dangers are irregular, 
inconstant, not to be counted upon as to their times and seasons.73
   
By the time he penned Art as Experience, nine years and four major works later, 
Dewey was willing to put it in more urgent language. “At every moment, the living 
creature is exposed to dangers from its surroundings, and at every moment it must 
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draw upon something in its surroundings to satisfy its needs.”74 Perhaps it was this 
urgency that led him to move away from working out the various sub-logics of the 
modes of experience and turn to inquiry in general. Only four years later, Dewey 
presented his Logic: The Theory of Inquiry in which he offered a concrete definition 
of the process of stabilizing the “aleatory world.” As he defined it, 
Inquiry is the controlled or directed transformation of an 
indeterminate situation into one that is so determinate in its 
constituent distinctions and relations as to convert the elements of 
the original situation into a unified whole.75
 
In order to understand this definition, however, we must first determine just what 
Dewey meant by the term ‘indeterminate situation,’ which he referred to as “the 
antecedent condition” of inquiry.  
Perhaps a good illustration of the indeterminate situation could be found in 
the activity of using a computer. As we type on the keyboard and click the mouse, 
opening and closing programs, doing what is now known as “multi-tasking,” we give 
little or no consideration to the physical interaction with the machine itself, only to 
that which appears on the screen. However, when something goes wrong, e.g. the 
screen “freezes” or an error message appears, we become acutely aware of those 
activities that were, just moments before, hidden in the background of experience. 
We are suddenly faced with a situation that irritates us (not just in the sense that we 
are left cursing the name of Bill Gates, but also in that the activity of life has 
suddenly ground to a halt) and we must employ a measure of thoughtfulness to 
                                                 
74 AE, LW 10:19 
75 LTI, LW 12:108 [emphasis added] 
 
40 
escape.76 This example highlights the contextual features of the indeterminate 
situation, which Dewey pointed out early on in his Logic, 
What is designated by the word "situation" is not a single object or 
event or set of objects and events. For we never experience nor 
form judgments about objects and events in isolation, but only in 
connection with a contextual whole…an object or event is always 
a special part, phase, or aspect, of an environing experienced 
world – a situation. 77
 
The “situation,” then, is a unity of meaningful commerce between an organism and its 
environment, a totality of significant relations that stays in the background of 
experience; it is, in a word, a context. The organism continues to be taken up with its 
surroundings until happenstance interrupts the flow of experience with uncertainty. 
“The singular object stands out conspicuously because of its especially focal and 
crucial position at a given time in determination of some problem of use or enjoyment 
which the total complex environment presents.”78 In other words, immediate objects 
within this situation seem to “object” to any sort of physical manipulation, and the 
organism no longer finds itself comfortably “situated” within the environment.  
The problem, then, is that there is nothing within the context that can be 
applied to the situation in order to resolve indeterminacy; it lacks what could be 
called the “contextual cues” needed for further action. Simply put, the context lacks 
fullness, i.e. it is impoverished. Stating the matter in more personal terms, the 
organism is left flailing about, grasping at straws. As mentioned above, there may be 
many potential strategies for escaping the imposition of this impoverished context, 
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e.g. supplication, accommodation, or tradition – such are the outcomes of the various 
non-cognitive modes – however, each is tantamount to avoidance. But, where these 
fail, the organism could be forced to employ what Dewey called “discourse through 
use of symbols” in order to escape.79 On his view, interruption opens up a space that 
“is not only ‘open’ to inquiry, but it is open in the sense that its constituents do not 
hang together.”80 This open space is the indeterminate situation. Dewey claimed that 
it was the “open” nature of an indeterminate situation that elicits inquiry to be 
“questionable; or in terms of actuality instead of potentiality, to be uncertain, 
unsettled, disturbed.”81 It is important to note that, on Dewey’s account, it is the 
situation that exhibits these qualities. Indeterminacy is not simply a “personal state of 
doubt,” nor is it merely an affair of objects; rather, indeterminacy involves an 
interaction. “For Nature is an environment only as it is involved in interaction with an 
organism, or self, or whatever name be used.”82 This is important because Dewey 
believed that when we move from indeterminate to determinate situations we are not 
merely “adapting” to meet the needs of the environment, nor are we “adjusting” the 
environment to meet our needs, but rather the result of inquiry is a “transformation” 
of both.     
The Pattern Of Inquiry 
 
According to Dewey, transformation of the indeterminate situation to 
determinate is “active and operational” wherever,  
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Organic interaction becomes inquiry when existential 
consequences are anticipated; when environing conditions are 
examined with reference to their potentialities; and when 
responsive activities are selected and ordered with reference to 
actualization of some of the potentialities, rather than others, in a 
final existential situation.83
Granted, that in responding to an indeterminate situation – like our computer 
example above – the desired outcome is an absence of irritation, however, the natural 
desire for a psychological state of comfort is only the mechanism that helps us stand 
up against indeterminacy. It is the employment of intelligence through inquiry that 
allows us to actually escape an indeterminate situation.  
Dewey first outlined the pattern of inquiry in his Democracy and Education 
(1916), where he identified five constitutive steps:  
(i)    perplexity, confusion, doubt, due to the fact that one is 
implicated in an incomplete situation whose full character is 
not yet determined;  
(ii) a conjectural anticipation--a tentative interpretation of the 
given elements, attributing to them a tendency to effect 
certain consequences; 
(iii) a careful survey (examination, inspection, exploration, 
analysis) of all attainable consideration which will define and 
clarify the problem in hand;  
(iv) a consequent elaboration of the tentative hypothesis to 
make it more precise and more consistent, because squaring 
with a wider range of facts;  
(v)   taking one stand upon the projected hypothesis as a plan of 
action which is applied to the existing state of affairs: doing 
something overtly to bring about the anticipated result, and 
thereby testing the hypothesis.84 
 
These could be summed up as doubt, interpretation, survey, elaboration and action. 
He believed these steps could occur in sequence or “telescope together” in 
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simultaneity, depending on the complexity of the situation.85 But, no matter how they 
occurred temporally, all five steps were required for inquiry to take place. 
 By 1938, however, Dewey had slightly revised these five steps. In his Logic 
volume, he outlined six steps, instead of the previous five – each of which can still 
easily be fit into the revised list.86 The first of these he identified as the indeterminate 
situation itself, which, of course, includes the perplexity and doubt that comprise (i) 
in the above list. However, it also conveys the interactional aspects of indeterminacy 
that those earlier, more subjective terms lacked.  
The second step in Dewey’s revised list was what he called the “institution of 
a problem.” Simply put, this refers to the clear statement of a problem and probably 
best corresponds to step (iii) in the above list. Dewey claimed, however, that it would 
have been proleptic to call the indeterminate situation a “problematic” one since it 
only “becomes problematic in the very process of being subjected to inquiry.”87 
Unfortunately in the academic world, as Dewey pointed out, too many “[p]roblems 
that are self-set are mere excuses for seeming to do something intellectual.”88 
Concerning this tendency, Dewey claimed, “It is a familiar and significant saying 
that a problem well put is half-solved.”89 Dewey admitted, however, that clearly 
stating a problem would only get the inquirer so far, “the determining of a genuine 
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problem is a progressive inquiry…where much prior ingestion and digestion have 
occurred”90  
This led him to the third step in his 1938 account, viz. the “determination of a 
problem solution.” In this vein, Dewey claimed that any situation that is altogether 
indeterminate would not lend itself to transformation. In order to get from 
indeterminacy to determinacy, then, requires the recognition of those factors in the 
situation – or as Dewey put it, “the facts of the case” – that are still determinate. This 
amounts to what could be called the formulation of a hypothesis, and includes both 
steps (ii) and (iv) from above. Explicating this step led Dewey to define ideas as 
“anticipated consequences.” 
Dewey simply called the fourth step in his revised account “reasoning.” His 
view of reasoning, however, was modeled after the Greek account of “logos,” insofar 
as it emphasized both rational and linguistic features. He argued that there was a 
double-aspect to experienced objects, since, on one hand, they are just what they are 
experienced as, and on the other, they indicate a relation to other objects in fulfilling 
some goal.91 This latter is a process of operating with signs, i.e. it is inherently 
“logical.” As he put it,  
When communication occurs, all natural events are subject to 
reconsideration and revision; they are re-adapted to meet the 
requirements of conversation, whether it be public discourse or that 
preliminary discourse termed thinking. Events turn into objects, 
things with a meaning… Events when once they are named lead an 
independent and double life.92
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On his view, when a future possibility is seen as an anticipated consequence, “the 
conclusion reached is not grounded, even if it happens to be correct. The check upon 
immediate acceptance is the examination of the meaning as a meaning.”93 In other 
words, the hypothesis that was formulated in the previous step of inquiry, Dewey 
argued, must be developed in relation to other conceptual structures. For him, even 
the “dumb pang of an ache” can achieve significance, i.e. meaning, when it becomes 
representational. This process of transforming events into signs is the consummation 
of experience par excellence, and illustrates one of the generic traits of experience, 
viz. the communicative.94 When it occurs in the indeterminate situation, a prediction 
about the outcome of experimentation can be posited. And, as he put it, not following 
this step will be the end of inquiry insofar as the hypothesis “is not developed in 
terms of the constellation of meanings to which it belongs,” and such a failure “can 
lead only to overt response.”95 This step best corresponds with the first part of (v) 
above, i.e. it consists in taking a stand on a projected hypothesis.  
Because he believed that events held a “double life (the concrete one of 
existence and the abstract one of meaning), Dewey identified the fifth step in the 
pattern of inquiry as, “the operational character of facts-meanings.” Prima facie, it 
may appear strange to combine two seemingly disparate terms such as “fact” and 
“meaning.” However, Dewey believed that, within the process of inquiry, facts are 
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always “operational” in that they are selected with respect to a purpose or goal. 
Dewey had this to say about facts in their capacity as meanings, 
The operative force of facts is apparent when we consider that no 
fact in isolation has evidential potency. Facts are evidential and are 
tests of an idea in so far as they are capable of being organized 
with one another. The organization can be achieved only as they 
interact with one another.96
 
On this view, facts are tied to meaning through the process of inquiry. As Dewey put 
it, “Naming them ‘operational’ is but a theoretical recognition of what is involved 
when inquiry satisfies the conditions imposed by the necessity for 
experimentation.”97 What this amounts to can best be summed up by the second part 
of step (v) above, viz. “doing something overtly to bring about the anticipated result, 
and thereby testing the hypothesis.” Dewey asserted that when inquiry is successful, 
the indeterminate is returned to determinate, but, if it is unsuccessful, then we must 
return to the third step, reinterpret the situation with this new information, and 
formulate a new hypothesis. 
The Determinate Situation as Enriched Context 
 
 The sixth and final step in Dewey’s revised list is what he termed “common 
sense and scientific inquiry.” This step occurs only when inquiry successfully 
satisfies the problem at hand. In reference to this step, Dewey again distinguished 
between (common-sense) inquiry that is done within the non-cognitive modes of 
experience and the (scientific) inquiry that is done within the cognitive mode. Of the 
former, he wrote,  
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They form a system but the system is practical rather than 
intellectual. It is constituted by the traditions, occupations, 
techniques, interests, and established institutions of the group. 
The meanings that compose it are carried in the common 
everyday language of communication between members of the 
group. The meanings involved in this common language system 
determine what individuals of the group may and may not do in 
relation to physical objects and in relations to one another. They 
regulate what can be used and enjoyed and how use and 
enjoyment shall occur.98
 
So, the downside to common sense inquiry is that it yields a very narrow set of 
solutions, i.e. the traditions and techniques it produces will disclose only a limited 
number of possible solutions. Conversely, scientific inquiry, according to Dewey, 
frees meaning from the interests of a particular group and allows meaning to become 
more abstract where “semantic coherence, as such, is the controlling 
consideration.”99 What issues forth is a pattern of reasoning that guides our inquiry 
vis-à-vis subsequent indeterminate situations. And, while this may also amount to a 
set of norms or imperatives, each is accepted or rejected only in terms of coherence 
with one another. This opens up the set of possible solutions to a problem.  
The difference between these types of norms and the traditional type could 
also be seen as one of form versus content. While common sense inquiry might 
provide content that is specific to the immediate needs of a particular group, it lacks a 
definite, repeatable structure. Scientific inquiry, on the other hand, provides a 
definite structure, or form, that can be used over and over in conjunction with new 
contents. What is true of both forms of inquiry, however, is that the last step in each 
amounts to the assimilation of a solution back into the original context. In the former 
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type, i.e. common sense inquiry, the assimilation is in reference to specific, 
immediate, environing conditions. It is a temporary solution; it is, in a very real 
sense, a “quick fix” to the problem at hand. In scientific inquiry, however, 
assimilation occurs on a more general, abstract scale. The solutions garnered from it 
may be applicable across an array of indeterminate situations.   But, just as the 
traditions and customs that are the product of common sense inquiry can limit the set 
of possible solutions, so too can the norms of scientific inquiry whenever they are 
viewed as foundations. Dewey warned against viewing these abstractions as static, 
eternal and immovable entities. As he put it, “Every such interaction [i.e. inquiry] is a 
temporal process, not a momentary cross-sectional occurrence.”100 Whereas common 
sense inquiry is a process of accommodation by the organism to meet the demands of 
the environing conditions, cognitive inquiry is a process of adjustment in the 
situation, in terms of both the environment and the organism.101 The result of which 
is an increase in complexity for both. Dewey described it as,  
The temporal quality of inquiry means, then, something quite other 
than that the process of inquiry takes time. It means that the objective 
subject-matter of inquiry undergoes temporal modification.”102  
 
Twenty-two years earlier, in Democracy and Education, Dewey had referred to this 
temporal modification as “plasticity,” and described it therein as “the capacity to 
retain and carry over from prior experience factors which modify subsequent 
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activities.”103 In his later work, Dewey would refer to this as the capacity for “habit-
formation.” As he put it in Experience and Nature, 
We find also in all these higher organisms that what is done is 
conditioned by consequences of prior activities; we find the fact 
of learning or habit-formation. In consequence, an organism acts 
with reference to a time-spread, a serial order of events, as a unit, 
just as it does in reference to a unified spatial variety. Thus an 
environment both extensive and enduring is immediately 
implicated in present behavior. Operatively speaking, the remote 
and the past are "in" behavior making it what it is.104
 
Thus, any transformation of the indeterminate into the determinate is a process of 
once again returning to a “unified whole,” except that, qua the outcome of cognitive 
inquiry, the determinate situation is a context that has been enriched, i.e. it has gained 
structure, through the development of a new habit. In the next chapter, this aspect of 
Dewey’s thought, i.e. the formation of habits, will be considered in detail. 
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CHAPTER THREE – GROWTH: THE OUTCOME OF CONTEXT AND THE 
PRAGMATIC METHOD 
We do not form habits, ordinarily, because we repeat, but we repeat because we have formed 
habits. A habit formed simply by repetition is very likely to be the undesirable sort of habit – 
that which is likely to be our master instead of being our servant. [LW 17:299-300] 
The Importance of Habit 
 
With the theoretical groundwork of Dewey’s contextualism in place, we may 
now turn our attention toward the discussion initiated in the preface of this analysis, 
viz. how his notion of context relates to the pragmatic method. Dewey often treated 
the reconstruction of habit as synonymous with pragmatic method. In order to 
understand why Dewey held habits in such high regard, it will be helpful to trace 
some of the more important influences on his unique stance.  Reconstructing habit 
for Dewey, however, involves the distinction, which was touched upon in the 
previous chapter, between habits as the product of cognitive inquiry (i.e. inquiry that 
is done within the cognitive mode of experience) and those that are the outcome of 
the other, non-cognitive inquiries (i.e. inquiries made from within the moral, 
practical, religious, or aesthetic modes of experience.) Establishing such a distinction 
will inevitably lead to Dewey’s concept of “growth,” which he considered to be 
dependent upon habit reconstruction. Arguably, the idea of growth (as the outcome 
of cognitive habit reconstruction) is both the single most important and most 
misunderstood strand running throughout Dewey’s philosophical, psychological and 
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pedagogical interests, the one that ties these interests together in terms of context. 
Unfortunately, many Dewey scholars choose to cast aside his work on growth, and 
focus instead on the less amorphous concepts of experience and inquiry.105 The final 
aim of this exegesis, therefore, will be to clarify how growth is the outcome of 
Dewey’s context.  
Just as Dewey’s views of experience and inquiry developed slowly over the 
course of several decades of writing, so too did his notion of habit. Throughout his 
career, the three concepts evolved symbiotically alongside one another. His first 
philosophical treatment of habit appeared in the years just following James’ release 
of The Principles of Psychology (1890), which made use of the term to undergird a 
type of psychological functionalism, and which Dewey admired for its rejection of 
many psychological dualisms. Simply put, functionalism is the theory that mental 
processes can be understood only in terms of usefulness. During the nine years after 
James’ Principles and leading up to his own “Psychology and Social Practice” 
(1899), Dewey wrote about habits in a resolutely behaviorist tone. Viewing habits 
through such a lens led him to question traditional notions of self, freedom, and 
necessity via James’ functionalist principles.  
His 1893 essay, “The Superstition of Necessity,” is an excellent indicator of 
this. There he identified the fallacy of the “necessitarian” as conflating what is 
“determinate,” in the sense of fully defined, with the cosmological belief in causation 
frequently called “determinism.” In this manner, Dewey characterized necessity as a 
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By Raymond D. Boisvert. Proceedings of the 2002 Society for the Advancement of American 
Philosophy Conference. www.american-
philosophy.org/archives/2002_Conference/2002_papers/boisvert_saito.htm, Mar. 6th 2005. 
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useful go-between term, i.e. one that was useful in explaining why two seemingly 
unrelated concepts were actually related, but “When it has succeeded, its value is 
nil.”106 There, Dewey said of necessity, 
When we say something or other must be so and so, the “must” 
does not indicate anything in the nature of the fact itself, but a trait 
in our judgment of that fact; it indicates the degree with which we 
have succeeded in making a whole out of the various elements 
which have to be taken into account in forming the judgment. More 
specifically, it indicates a half-way stage.107
 
On Dewey’s account, causal necessity is merely the connection we make between 
two seemingly unconnected ideas, it is a go-between, the “mid-wife” of judgment 
and is only useful insofar as it links up one part of a whole with another part, but 
once that link is made it is no longer helpful in our understanding of the whole. Like 
Hume before him, Dewey argued that necessity was the name for our habit of getting 
carried away by the constitution of a whole by its various parts and thus talking 
about the parts as causing the whole rather than merely making it up.108  
 Dewey claimed that this conflating of whole-part relationships with causal 
links can be a hindrance to human inquiry because, “objects as they are for us, as 
known, [must] change with the development of our judgments.”109 But, when 
necessity is taken to be an essential component of the universe then, as he put it, 
“Once the Ptolemaic conception is well rooted, cycles and epicycles, almost without 
end, are superadded, rather than reconstruct the original object.”110  
                                                 
106 EW 4:20 
107 EW 4:20 [Dewey’s emphasis] 
108 This is the tendency that Dewey labeled the “necessitarian fallacy.” 
109 EW 4:22 
110 EW 4:24 
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Dewey’s proposal was that we strip the notion of necessity of any ontological 
(real world) status that it might enjoy and instead view it as a useful tool in helping 
us reconstruct theories whenever new data arise. He believed that it is often easier for 
us to form a new theory than to continue to heap exceptions-to-the-rules upon old 
ones.111 He believed that if we could adopt this principle of action, then perhaps we 
could avoid the stagnations in thought, i.e. stagnations of convention, that have 
caused some of the greatest suffering in history. And, it was from within this 
Humean line of reasoning that Dewey first considered the “reconstruction” of habit. 
In that initial treatment, found in “The Psychology of Effort” (1897), he referred to 
reconstruction as a “process” of “adaptation to new conditions” by “bodily states” of 
action.112 This accentuates the connotations of “habit” as it is used in its verb form, 
meaning “to dwell” or “to reside.” And, Dewey’s interest in “habit” becomes even 
more apparent when one considers its etymological connection with terms related to 
the notion of environment (terms like “habitat” and “inhabit”) so prevalent in 
Dewey’s work.  
However, Dewey’s work in education in the latter half of the 1890’s, 
particularly his involvement in the “Laboratory School” at the University of Chicago, 
led him to develop this position even further before the turn of the century. 
Observing the difference that education could make on habituated conduct, Dewey 
rejected the one-directional view of habit, i.e. one that posited habit as merely the 
outcome of conditioning stimuli, in favor of a more dynamic and socially integrated 
                                                 
111 Thomas Kuhn’s work in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions crystallized this sentiment in the 
concept of paradigm. 
112 EW 5:162 
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interpretation. This was the view he defended in “Psychology and Social Practice” 
(1899), “The School and Society” (1900), and “The Child and the Curriculum” 
(1902). In those essays, Dewey decried the prevalent psychological models for their 
failure to provide an intelligible account of child psychology. Those models, on his 
account, tried to explain the psychological disposition of children in reference to 
adult psychological standards. As he put it in “Psychology and Social Practice,” 
[The child] is engaged in forming habits rather than in definitely 
utilizing those already formed. Consequently he is absorbed in 
getting that all-around contact with persons and things, that range 
of acquaintance with the physical and ideal factors of life, which 
shall afford the background and material for the specialized aims 
and pursuits of later life. He is, or should be, busy in the formation 
of a flexible variety of habits whose sole immediate criterion is 
their relation to full growth. 
 
This suggests that, in a sense, habits can be seen as prior to stimuli, i.e. the 
child already possesses the capacity for habits before stimuli that bring that capacity 
into fruition ever appear. Habits, on this view, are pulled from the front by biological 
and social factors, rather than pushed from behind by factors that were traditionally 
explained in the language of physics or theology. In other words, Dewey believed 
that human beings were “creatures of habit,” but he saw habits as potentialities that 
were antecedent to experience rather than a byproducts of rote action. Habits, for 
Dewey, are “pulled from the front” insofar as they are only fixed by their fruitfulness 
in attaining future ends, much as genetic mutations in species are only fixed when 
they provide some marginal aid in adapting to environmental changes. This 
realization jibed well with Dewey’s already heavily Darwinian leanings and was 
reinforced by his rejection of the empiricist’s fallacy in his essay on the reflex arc 
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concept. He concluded that determinism and psychological functionalism were 
incompatible insofar as the latter portrayed habits as a sort of “feedback loop” that 
undermined the traditional view of causality on which the former depended by 
showing that habits and environment shape one another. For Dewey, this point 
further undermined the notion of causality, and he quickly ruled determinism out of 
court.113 As Dewey would later write in Experience and Nature, 
The reality is the growth-process itself; childhood and adulthood 
are phases of a continuity, in which just because it is a history, the 
later cannot exist until the earlier exists ("mechanistic 
materialism" in germ); and in which the later makes use of the 
registered and cumulative outcome of the earlier--or, more 
strictly, is its utilization ("spiritualistic teleology" in germ). The 
real existence is the history in its entirety, the history as just what 
it is. The operations of splitting it up into two parts and then 
having to unite them again by appeal to causative power are 
equally arbitrary and gratuitous.114
 
 Forming Habits Through Inquiry 
 
By the time he had released Democracy and Education in 1916, Dewey had 
fully adopted a biological/social stance on habit formation, i.e. one that emphasized 
the feedback loop aspect of habits. There, he referred to the capacity to form habits 
as the innate “plasticity” of human beings and laid the groundwork for the distinction 
between cognitive and non-cognitive habits that would be the touchstone of his idea 
of inquiry. As he explained therein, responding to a problematic situation – like our 
                                                 
113 In The Metaphysical Club, Louis Menand speculated that the death of Dewey’s young son, Morris, 
was the main catalyst in his educational interests, since Dewey had written in some of his personal 
correspondence with family that he was becoming a student of his son’s growth. In a similar fashion, 
one could hypothesize that Dewey’s rejection of determinism, which followed on the heels of Morris’ 
death in 1895, was another outcome of the loss. Of course, such a claim can only remain purely 
conjecture, as Dewey was not prone to writing about himself in an emotionally revealing manner. 
What is clear, however, is that for whatever reason, by 1900 Dewey had begun to view habits as a 
fundamental part of human character and thus he set out to examine them in detail. 
114 EN, LW 1:210 
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computer example from the preceding chapter – is brought about by the natural 
desire to alleviate indeterminacy. In this regard, Dewey followed Peirce in the belief 
that uncertainty was an irritation that human beings were compelled to avoid. 
However, Dewey argued that the natural desire for a psychological state of comfort is 
merely a mechanism that helps us stand up against indeterminacy. In other words, 
instincts, on Dewey’s view, are not foundational; they are merely “elements in 
habits.”115 What is needed in order to actually relieve the irritation, then, is a means 
of getting back in synchronicity with the environment. The natural way of dealing 
with objects that arise in the problematic situation is in terms of value, i.e. they either 
have positive or negative value in regard to escaping indeterminacy. For Dewey, 
value is a product of inquiry, yet it arises from an inquiry that is made from within a 
non-cognitive mode of experience. There is nothing – no fact, object, or entity – that 
has intrinsic value antecedent to whatever purpose the situation brings to the table. 
The philosopher, carpenter, artist, and environmentalist all view a particular tree in 
different ways, but it would be senseless to assert that any one of them sees the tree 
“as it is in itself.” The tree is valuable, of course, regardless of whichever view one 
takes, but its value is always dependent on a particular end. So, the environmentalist 
may value the tree because of its ability to slow erosion, the artist for its symmetry, 
the carpenter for the quality of the wood, and the philosopher because of the noise it 
might not make when it falls, but each values the tree for the function it fulfills in 
attaining some end. Dewey called this type of transaction with one’s surroundings, 
“valuation.” Simply put, valuation involves the habit, or capacity, of ranking several 
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preferences in the order of which will be most beneficial in alleviating the irritation 
of indeterminacy. But, this habit is only a proto-process of means-ends manipulation, 
it lacks the more complex capacity of dealing with objects as abstract signs, and as 
such, Dewey saw it as affective rather than cognitive. 116 While the affective types of 
strategy toward indeterminacy may involve minimal cognitive capacity, since it gets 
“worked out in terms of concrete conditions available for its realization, i.e. in terms 
of means,” it still cannot provide knowledge, but only a type of repeatable norm, i.e. 
a “value” that can help avoid indeterminacy.117  
On Dewey’s view, only the employment of a habit that has been formed by 
inquiry from within the cognitive mode of experience – the habit he called 
“intelligence” – can allow for an actual transformation of an indeterminate situation. 
The habits of valuation alone do not offer the requisite tools for transformation. But, 
against the traditional view which treated intelligence as synonymous with the 
faculty of reason and, subsequently, as inherent within human beings (a priori is the 
technical term), Dewey claimed that intelligence is not prior to experience. He often 
referred to intelligence in terms of ‘reasonableness’ rather than as an a priori faculty. 
This difference places emphasis on the activity of intelligence. On his account, an 
inquirer may do something reasonable, such as choosing to build a boat out of 
teakwood planks, or something unreasonable, such as crafting a similar vessel out of 
                                                 
116 There have been many thinkers who sought to cast aside the fact-value distinction. On such a view, 
there would be no clear delineation between “subject” and “object” or between "ought" and "is." 
Dewey was one such thinker. He argued that the relationship between facts and values resembles a 
spectrum more than it does one of polar opposites. There are many things on the fact side of that 
spectrum. But, even those things have some value imparted to them by the organism, through the 
process of valuation. Likewise, those things that sit pretty far on the value side, e.g. the morally or 
aesthetically praiseworthy, still have some fact of the matter about them. 
117 HNC, MW 14:217 [emphasis added] 
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matchsticks. In either case, value has guided action, but only when judged against a 
particular end (in this case boat-building) is the reasonableness of an action 
demonstrable.  
Knowledge, on the traditional view, is either something found in the world or 
in the mind. For Dewey, though, knowledge is the outcome of an inquiry wherein the 
habits of intelligence transform indeterminate situations into determinate ones. In 
other words, all knowledge – even that which has been traditionally termed 
“prepositional” – is essentially a skill, one acquired through developing appropriate 
habits.   
Perhaps Dewey’s most robust expression of habit can be found in his 1922 
work, Human Nature and Conduct, a third of which was devoted to the topic. There, 
Dewey described habits in the same kind of interactional terms that he would 
continue to use in Experience and Nature, Art as Experience, and Logic: The Theory 
of Inquiry. To illustrate, he wrote  
…habits are like [physiological] functions in many respects, and 
especially in requiring the cooperation of organism and 
environment… habits are arts… They are working adaptations of 
personal capacities with environing forces. 118  
 
This echoes the view laid out in Democracy and Education that habits are social 
functions. Yet, in Human Nature, Dewey made strides to describe further the relation 
between the social function of habits and inquiry, which he accomplished by 
identifying it in terms of meaning rather than value. Talking about “meaning” allows 
for consequences of actions to be re-evaluated whenever necessary, whereas talking 
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about “value” implies reference to a realm of transcendent essences that Dewey 
wished to avoid. As he put it,  
[Children] owe to adults the opportunity to express their native 
activities in ways which have meaning. Even if by some miracle 
original activity could continue without assistance from the 
organized skill and art of adults, it would not amount to anything. 
It would be mere sound and fury. In short, the meaning of native 
activities is not native; it is acquired. It depends upon interaction 
with a mature social medium.119
 
This shift in emphasis from value to meaning is important for two reasons. First, 
because Dewey believed it better conveyed the formation of habits in a non-
instinctual light, one that could more readily account for the diversity of cultures 
found in various environments. According to him, 
Admission that the idea of, say, standing erect [an activity usually 
identified as completely instinctual] is dependent upon sensory 
materials is, therefore equivalent to recognition that it is 
dependent upon the habitual attitudes which govern concrete 
sensory materials. The medium of habit filters all the material that 
reaches our perception and thought. The filter is not, however, 
chemically pure. It is a reagent which adds new qualities and 
rearranges what is received. Our ideas truly depend upon 
experience, but so do our sensations. And the experience upon 
which they both depend is the operation of habits--originally of 
instincts.120
 
He saw the view that instincts were separable and thus antecedent to habits as yet 
another instance of the empiricist’s fallacy. On his view, it would be erroneous to 
believe that instincts precede habits simply because such seems to be the case when 
an individual is considered in isolation from society. For, he believed that “if an 
individual be isolated in this fashion, along with the fact of primacy of instinct we 
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find also the fact of death.”121 Diversity, then, comes from the fact that “native stock 
has been modified by interaction with different environments,” both natural and 
social, not from a difference in native capacities or instincts. Cultural differences can 
arise within the same natural environment because habits can be formed from within 
any one of the modes of experience, as our tree example above illustrated.122  
 But, as we have seen from Dewey’s view of experience, the difference among 
environments should be couched in temporal as well as spatial terms, since “the 
environment in which the act takes place is never twice alike.”123 On Dewey’s 
account, the “differences of objective result” that stem from the differences in the 
surrounding environment (both living and non-living) “are the only components of 
the meaning of the act.”124 As we saw in the previous chapter, Dewey claimed that 
the fourth step in cognitive inquiry involved “the examination of meaning as 
meaning.”125 This presents the second benefit of shifting from “value” terms to 
“meaning” terms when talking about habit formation, i.e. the latter can better capture 
the fluidity of the interaction between organisms and environments insofar as 
meanings, like consummatory experiences, can always be re-evaluated as they move 
through experience with us. Realizing this, Dewey thought, could protect against the 
calcification of the means-end distinction. Thus, Dewey referred to all ends as “ends-
in-view,” because, regardless of what mode of inquiry an organism employs, it can 
only respond to indeterminacy by surveying the possible outcomes that are “in view” 
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of its particular set of habits. Thus, we see the major difference between habits as the 
outcome of cognitive inquiry and those of the non-cognitive variety. The habits 
which are employed in the former, which Dewey called intelligence, involve 
manipulation of abstract symbols, or meanings, whereas the latter involve the 
manipulation of values, which are always more proximate than meanings. In other 
words, cognitive habits form the principles of thought, on which logic and 
mathematics are based. Non-cognitive habits form the principles of normativity, on 
which aesthetics and ehtics are based. The former yield knowledge, the latter – 
attitudes.       
Habit Reconstruction and Growth 
 
 Although both types of inquiry can lead to the formation of habits, only the 
cognitive variety can lead to the type of re-evaluation of its habits that Dewey 
referred to as “reconstruction.” It achieves this through the versatility of meaning. As 
Dewey put it, 
The more numerous our habits the wider the field of possible 
observation and foretelling. The more flexible they are, the more 
refined is perception in its discrimination and the more delicate 
the presentation evoked by imagination.126
 
Because cognitive inquiry employs habits that deal with meaning, this type of 
inquiry can lead to the changing of those habits whenever they produce a solution 
that does not cohere with other meanings. This is where experimentation, which 
Dewey believed was merely a description of the default setting in which all “live 
creatures” operated, comes into focus within his account. As he had explained over a 
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decade earlier, in his How We Think (1910), when any organism is presented with a 
series of events it will inevitably relate them to past experiences. Dewey claimed that 
the limitation of valuation within non-cognitive modes of experience is that it 
“affords no way of discriminating between right and wrong conclusions.”127 Thus, 
by itself, it does not provide the habits of deciding between simple conclusions such 
as “phlogiston” or  “opium’s dormative powers” against more complex explanations 
such as “combining oxygen with a combustible” or “a chemical reaction in the 
brain.” Cognitive inquiry, on the other hand, has an apparatus for distinguishing 
between competing theses. This apparatus is the habit of abstraction, or meaning 
manipulation. As Dewey put it, “Experiment is the chief resource in scientific 
reasoning because it facilitates the picking out of significant elements in a gross, 
vague whole.”128 He thought new interpretations arose through experimentation in 
response to particular problems. The difference, in the end, between cognitive 
inquiry and non-cognitive valuation boils down to the ability to create new habits via 
new interpretations of the meaning of action. Thus, habit reconstruction amounts to 
the ability to create new habits through interpretation. 
 The creation of new habits is, in general terms, what Dewey referred to as 
“growth.” In his words,  
Habits take the form both of habituation, or a general and 
persistent balance of organic activities with the surroundings, and 
of active capacities to readjust activity to meet new conditions. 
The former furnishes the background of growth; the latter 
constitute growth.129
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As stated above, this general notion of growth was featured prominently in most of 
Dewey’s writings, especially the moral and pedagogic ones. Perhaps a definition, in 
this general sense, could be found in Democracy and Education, where Dewey 
called growth the “cumulative movement of action toward a later result.”130  
This definition, however, is perhaps too vague. With it, Dewey did not mean 
to reinstate what he saw as “a false idea of growth or development, – that it is a 
movement toward a fixed goal.”131 And with this in mind, he claimed, “Growth is 
[mistakenly] regarded as having an end, instead of being an end.”132 On his view, 
then, growth “has no end beyond itself.”133 Throughout both Democracy and 
Education and Human Nature and Conduct, Dewey laid out many of the conditions 
of growth in hope of establishing a more detailed description.  
Two of these conditions have already been discussed in this analysis, viz. the 
“need for others” and “plasticity.” These are most visibly featured in Democracy and 
Education because of Dewey’s belief that “both of these conditions are at their 
height in childhood and youth.”134 But, the primary condition of growth, for him, 
was “immaturity,” which he claimed includes the notions of capacity and 
potentiality. According to Dewey, immaturity, like capacity and like potentiality, is 
not properly understood as a negative term. 
Capacity may denote mere receptivity, like the capacity of a quart 
measure. We may mean by potentiality a merely dormant or 
quiescent state--a capacity to become something different under 
external influences. But we also mean by capacity an ability, a 
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power; and by potentiality potency, force. Now when we say that 
immaturity means the possibility of growth, we are not referring 
to absence of powers which may exist at a later time; we express a 
force positively present--the ability to develop.135
 
The upshot of this view is not only process that growth is a process of “becoming,” 
but that it is a process of becoming that ought not reach a point of terminus. 
Although growth is the transformation of the indeterminate to the determinate, this 
should not suggest once this transformation has taken place that growth has ended. 
And, this point is the reason Dewey warned against interpreting consummatory 
experience as a break in the continuity of experience. Likewise, achieving a new 
power of interaction with the environment through the reconstruction of habit is best 
understood as a pause, not a break in the process of growth. This is the point that 
Dewey later developed in his 1932 Ethics text, where he wrote,  
It is in the quality of becoming that virtue resides. We set up this 
and that end to be reached, but the end is growth itself. To make 
an end a final goal is but to arrest growth.136
 
With this statement, Dewey wanted to show that character (his expression for 
motives or intentions) and conduct (acts) are inseparable because they are only 
different sides of habit formation, and consequently, growth. Therefore, Dewey 
argued that the habits produced by cognitive inquiry provide freedom to individuals 
insofar as they open up the possibility for new interpretations, whereas habits formed 
through repetition, i.e. tradition, restrict freedom and often become our masters by 
restricting growth.  
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  If experience is the formation of context, and inquiry enriches that context, 
then growth could be seen as the outcome of context. In this sense, it is noteworthy 
that the term ‘edification’ can be substituted for growth taken in the sense of habit 
acquisition, without a loss of meaning. It is common to refer to someone who has the 
refined habits concomitant with education as “edified,” and the relationship between 
this expression and the root it shares with “edifice” should not be overlooked. Those 
who have received an expansive education have “built up” their habits of interacting 
with their surroundings. Similarly, when a community permits individuals to grow, it 
will experience growth as well. Thus, it would seem that Dewey’s work on 
experience, inquiry, and growth illustrated the importance of context and offered us a 
rich and detailed understanding of culture. 
Pragmatic Method and Context 
 
            One of Dewey’s most pressing concerns was that philosophy had become yet 
another tradition that arrested growth. Although most philosophical schools of 
thought employed empirical and critical methods, he saw the method of pragmatism 
as the only one that fostered growth through an orientation toward practicality. This 
is what led Dewey to devote so much time to the concepts of experience, inquiry, and 
growth. When empirical method is oriented in such a way, the active features of 
experience are highlighted and interaction becomes the most dependable model, 
which consequently blurs the distinction between the creature and its surroundings. 
When critical, or reflective, methods are pointed toward real world results, then 
inquiry takes on a decidedly experimental tone and the meaningfulness of actions 
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becomes easier to account for. And, when these concepts are combined, it becomes 
obvious that the notion of self is a byproduct of the habits acquired by the practical 
import of these dealings with surroundings. Therefore, on Dewey’s view, the 
pragmatic method succeeds where other methods fail because it recognizes the 
importance of contexts and, when followed, can lead to a transformation of those 
contexts. Simply put, pragmatism makes philosophy relevant again; it gives it the 
power to affect its surroundings, whether natural or cultural, and Dewey’s version of 
pragmatic method offers a means of improving culture. 
First, his work on experience brought out its natural elements of interaction 
between organism and environment. We saw that, for him, experience is coterminous 
with context, and in a general sense, with culture itself. We also saw that experience 
is divisible into several modes, each with its own strategy for coping with the 
instability of the environment. Some of those modes, i.e. those which do not involve 
reflection, involve a type of coping that relies upon the principle of value. And, 
although these modes can provide the organism with helpful habits, the growth that 
derives from those habits is a spreading out, not a building up of culture. Context, in 
such an instance, is broad – but it has no depth – it is, in a word, superficial. One of 
the modes of experience, however, has proven to be successful in transforming 
indeterminacy, viz. the cognitive. When inquiry is made within this mode, cognitive 
habits are formed that can enrich the context. These habits provide the organism a 
chance to grow, and subsequently society and culture will grow as well. 
 
67 
By emphasizing pragmatic method, which excels in the capacity to identify 
and transform context, Dewey provided philosophy a powerful tool in critiquing 
culture. One of Dewey’s most oft-quoted passages put it thusly,  
Philosophy recovers itself when it ceases to be a device for 
dealing with the problems of philosophers and becomes a 
method, cultivated by philosophers, for dealing with the problems 
of men.137
 
And, although the intellectual climate in this country has changed dramatically in the 
eighty-odd years since Dewey penned those words, they seem just as appropriate 
now as they did when he wrote them. I submit that the rest of Dewey’s thought could 
be useful in revitalizing American intellectual life, since, on his view, the 
responsibility of the philosopher is to be just as concerned with public issues as with 
esoteric ones. Social hope, i.e. the hope for a free and peaceful society, is consistent 
with Deweyan contextualism and, thus, his might be the position philosophy will 
have to adopt if it seeks to ever plunge back into the realm of public affairs.     
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